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NOTES
UNIFORM PRICING IN CONCENTRATED MARKETS:
IS CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM PROHIBITED BY
ARTICLE 85(l) OF THE TREATY OF ROME?
Of the difficult problems of antitrust regulation confronting the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC), one of the most perplexing is how to
prevent stagnation of price competition in concentrated markets. Article
85(1) of the Treaty of Rome prohibits "agreements," "decisions," and "con-
certed practices" which are designed to prevent, restrict, or distort
competition.' When price competition has ceased among enterprises in
any given market, and the antitrust authorities are unable to prove the
existence of an "agreement" or "decision," attention turns to whether
"concerted practices" can be shown.2 The problem which has yet to be
solved satisfactorily is precisely what constitutes a "concerted practice."
Is some element of anticompetitive intent required, or is the existence in
fact of an ostensibly noncompetitive market situations sufficient? Stated
differently, must the EEC Commission find at least some tacit or informal
agreement to cooperate, or does "concerted practice" mean strict liability
for price uniformity?
These questions acquire added significance when the enterprises under
investigation are participants in a concentrated market.4 In such a market
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957,
art. 85(1), 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2005 (1973):
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of under-
takings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or dis-
tortion of competition within the common market ....
An unofficial English translation appears in 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-48.
2. The reason is an evidentiary one. It is possible to find "concerted practices" from
circumstantial evidence where there is no other evidence that enterprises have entered
into any formal mutual agreement. 6 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, GUmE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BusINEss PRACTCES, EEC 2.0, at
1 (1962).
S. An ostensibly noncompetitive market situation or relationship broadly refers to a
set of market facts or circumstances of economic interaction between two or more
enterprises which would be present if those enterprises had mutually agreed not to
compete, but which is not necessarily in fact the result of such an agreement.
4. A concentrated market, for purposes of this discussion, is a near oligopoly
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it is theoretically possible for purely competitive, independent decision-
making based on rational economic calculation to thrust the enterprises
involved into an outwardly noncompetitive market relationship which is
virtually indistinguishable from that which would be produced by mutual
agreement not to compete.5 This can happen when the enterprises are
practicing what is called "conscious parallelism," by which the market
behavior of hypothetical enterprise A tends to conform to that of its
competitor enterprise B, simply because A has acted independently
in response to, or in anticipation of the actions of B.6 In a concentrated
market, competitors enjoy an increased ability to correctly anticipate each
other's actions because of the simplification of economic calculations re-
sulting from the small number of enterprises in the market.7 Thus, as
market "transparency" increases, so does the likelihood of price uni-
formity without any type of mutual agreement.
It is one of the fundamental assumptions of this Note that "conscious
parallelism" is justifiable competitive behavior and should be distin-
guished from "concerted practices."8 On a conceptual level, such a distinc-
situation where there are only a few sellers, of relatively equal and often great size
and capacity, who supply all or most of the products of a particular industry.
5. This is a phenomenon known as "oligopolistic interdependence." For a more
complete discussion of this basic theory, see J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 304-48
(2d ed. 1968); E. CnAMBERLIN, THE TEoRY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 30-35 (8th
ed. 1962); W. FE.NER, COMPETITION AMONG THE Fra 3-50, 175-83 (1949); 13 VA. J. INT'L
L. 375, 377 n.10 (1973).
6. See generally Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach,
21 STAN. L. Rxv. 1562 (1969); Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman
Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusal to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962).
7. Id. See also 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 375, 377 n.10 (1973).
8. See 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 375, 376 n.9 (1973) and accompanying text. See .also Turner,
supra note 6, at 665, who argues that the theory of oligopolistic interdependence
provides a basis for excluding conscious parallelism from the meaning of "conspiracy."
Seeing conscious parallelism as an economically rational course of action in a con-
centrated market, he states:
To repeat, it can fairly be said that the rational oligopolist is behaving in
exactly the same way as is the rational seller in a competitively structured
industry; he is simply taking another factor into account, which he has to
take into account because the situation in which he finds himself put it there.
Turner, supra note 6, at 665-66. Turner's thesis is challenged by Posner, supra note 6,
at 1566-67, who criticizes the theory of oligopolistic interdependence on several grounds,
pointing out that it makes certain assumptions which yet remain to be conclusively
proved. Included are the following: that there is no appreciable time lag between one
competitor's action and another's response, that all participants have an equal ability
to expand output at the same rate, and that all sales from price reductions are diverted
from rivals. Posner's argument is that "tacit collusion or noncompetitive pricing is not
inherent in an oligopolistic market structure but, like conventional cartehzing, requires
additional, voluntary behavior by sellers," in the form of cooperation and enforcement
of that cooperation. Posner, supra note 6, at 1578. But Posner does not really invalidate
the theory of oligopolistic interdependence as a basis for conceptually distinguishing
conscious parallelism, he merely demonstrates that it is less easy for uniformity to be
produced by purely independent action than the theory might at first imply.
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tion can be made by definition. The term "conscious parallelism" can be
understood as a form of over-competition 9 in which actively competing
enterprises learn so much about each other that by sophisticated, rational,
independent decision-making, based on carefully calculated probabilities,
they are able to neutralize each other's pricing behavior, producing an
ostensibly noncompetitive relationship. Conversely, "concerted practice"
can be defined as a uniformity or parallelism of behavior artificially in-
duced by actions taken in accordance with a mutual understanding be-
tween parties to substitute cooperation for the risks of competition. 10 On
a practical level, the difference between concerted practice and conscious
parallelism can be recognized only by the application of workable stan-
dards of proof which differentiate honest, sustained efforts by competing
enterprises to abide by the rules of the economic system, on the one hand,
from the planned coordination of cooperating enterprises to override it
on the other. Such standards have yet to be articulated.1 '
The importance of maintaining the distinction is dear. If "concerted
practice" is understood to include "conscious parallelism," then article
85(1) imposes a form of strict liability for the creation of price uniformity,
regardless of the culpability of the parties. Such an outcome disdains any
suggestion that competition is a state of mind as well as an objective
phenomenon.12 Accordingly, in recognition of the view that noncompeti-
tive behavior requires anticompetitive intent, the purpose of this Note
is threefold: (1) to show that Common Market tribunals have interpreted
"concerted practice" to mean strict liability for noncompetitive effects in
concentrated markets; (2) to demonstrate how this is inconsistent with
the purposes of the Treaty of Rome and the needs of the Common
Market and to suggest the meaning of "concerted practice" most ap-
propriate for a system of antitrust regulation based upon culpable anti-
9. Finding the nature of "conscious parallelism" in the idea of competition is con-
sidered, but not developed, by C. OBERWORFER, A. GLEISS, & M. HlsCH, COMMON MAlcuIr
CARTEL Lw 12, at 14-15 (2d ed. 1971):
"Concerted practices" therefore are not present where several enterprises merely
act identically in the market or where an enterprise merely adapts itself to the
market behavior of one or more of its competitors; such conduct need not be
based on mutual concert of action, but can be the result of keen competition.
See also Note, Conscious Parallelism-Fact or Fancy?, 3 STAN. L. Rv. 679, 693 (1951);
Givens, Parallel Business Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 5 ANTrrusT BULL. 273 (1960)
(recognizing that parallel conduct tends to be required by competition but not seeing
that as a basis for distinguishing it from concerted action).
10. See generally Posner, supra note 6, at 1577; Turner, supra note 6, at 665.
11. See 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 375, 379 (1973). See also F. A. Mann, The Dyestuffs Case in
the Court of Justice of The European Communities, 22 INT'L & Comt. L.Q. 35, 37 (1973).
12. See notes 28-31 infra and accompanying text.
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competitive conduct; and (3) to enunciate workable standards of proof
for distinguishing in fact between conscious parallelism and concerted
practices.
I
DYESTUFFS AND STRICT LIABILTY
The first attempt by the European Court of Justice to give content to
the article 85(1) notion of concerted practices was in Imperial Chemical
Industries, Ltd. v. EEC Commission.'3 In that case, ICI, a British corpo-
ration, marketed dyestuffs through subsidiaries in which it held a con-
trolling interest and which were located in the European Economic
Community. The Court found that ICI, through its subsidiaries, acted
in concert with other EEC dyestuffs producers14 to simultaneously and
uniformly fix, on three occasions, rates of price increases.r It defined
13. 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8161 (1973), 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557 (Eur. Ct. of
Justice 1972), aff'g Commission Decision of July 24, 1969, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder:
New Developments] CCH CoMM. MKT. Rn'. 9314, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D23 (R.P. Supp.
1969) (Comm'n of the EEC 1969) [hereinafter cited textually as Dyestuffs].
14. ICI brought the appeal to the European Court of Justice after the EEC Com-
mission, in a decision of May 31, 1967, had found that ten producers of dyestuffs-of
which ICI was one-had engaged in concerted practices in violation of article 85(1).
The producers were: Bayer, BASF, Cassella, and Hoechst (Germany); Francolor
(France); ACNA (Italy); Ciba, Geigy and Sandoz (Switzerland); Imperial Chemical
Industries, Ltd. (U.K.). These ten producers, generally large in size, accounted for eighty
percent of the market. They were actively engaged in competition, not only in the
quality of their products, but in technical assistance and price, through substantial
discounts given selectively to important customers. Average interchangeability of stan-
dard dyestuffs was relatively high. In addition, the dyestuffs market was characterized
by the fact that there were five isolated national markets with varying price levels
and each such market exhibited oligopolistic features. This partitioning was due to
the need to offer on-the-spot assistance and to guarantee immediate delivery. On a
majority of these markets, the price level was formed under the influence of a price
leader. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8161, at 8027-28 (1972), 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at623-24.
15. Between January 1964 and October 1967, there were three general and uniform
increases in the prices of dyestuffs in the Community. On January 7, 1964, Ciba-Italy,
on instructions from Ciba-Switzerland, announced and immediately put into effect a
fifteen percent price increase. The other producers on the Italian market followed
within two or three days and on January 9, 1964, ICI Holland initiated an identical
increase for the Netherlands as did Bayer for the Belgium-Luxembourg market. Gener-
ally, these affected the same range of products, i.e. most aniline dyes.
The 1965 price increases went into effect on January 1 and had been announced in
advance by several enterprises. On the German market, the increases amounted to
fifteen percent for the products whose prices had already been raised by the same
percentage on other markets and to ten percent on other products. BASF first an-
nounced the proposed price increase on October 14, 1964, and was followed by Bayer
on October 80 and Cassella on November 5. All of the other producers named in the
Commission's decision, except ACNA of Italy, joined in the general price increase which
was put into effect simultaneously in all markets except the Italian market because
[Vol. 7: 113
Conscious Parallelism in the EEG
the term "concerted practices" to mean a "form of coordination between
enterprises that has not yet reached the point where there is a contract in
the true sense of the word but which, in practice, consciously substitutes
a practical cooperation for the risks of competition." 1
While the Court's definition of "concerted practice" includes the ad-
verb "consciously," the phrase in which it is found is modified by the
preceeding phrase "in practice," which would seem to mean "in fact"
or "in effect." If this is correct, the definition could better be understood
as a form of coordination which has the effect of consciously substituting
a practical cooperation for the risks of competition. What does the Court
mean by "practical cooperation"? Why not simply use the term "coopera-
tion"? Clearly, there are strong indications that the Court's definition of
"concerted practice" focuses on ends rather than means, on consequences
rather than culpability. 17
In its arguments before the Court, ICI maintained that what had taken
place was mere conscious parallelism, and not a concerted practice.1 8 The
Court attributed little significance to that position noting that conscious
parallelism can be a
decisive indication of [concerted practices] where it leads to competitive condi-
tions that are not, considering the nature of the goods, the size and number
of the enterprises concerned, and the extent of the market, normal market
conditions.19
A reasonable interpretation of this is that when abnormal market condi-
tions appear, conscious parallelism is no different than a concerted
practice.20
of ACNA's refusal and the French market because of a price freeze. The range of
products affected did not vary between enterprises.
The 1967 increase followed a similar pattern. At a meeting attended by all the
producers named (except ACNA), which was held in Basel on August 18, 1967, the
Swiss-based firm Geigy announced its intention to raise prices by eight percent as of
October 16, 1967. Bayer and Francolor made similar announcements on the same oc-
casion, and by September all enterprises named in the decision had announced an
eight percent price increase (twelve percent in France) to take effect on October 16 in
all countries except Italy, where ACNA again refused to raise prices. Id. at 8028-29,
11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 624-25.
16. Id. at 8027, 11 Comm. Vkt L.R. at 622. In its decision, the Court found a con-
certed practice by imposing a form of strict liability on the dyestuffs producers for the
uniform price increases of 1964, 1965, and 1967. This is apparent upon an examination
of how the Court defined "concerted practice," how it described the relationship be-
tween "conscious parallelism" and "concerted practices" and most importantly, how it
evaluated the evidence it used in finding a concerted practice.
17. By adopting such a definition, the Court seems to prefer a result-oriented ap-
proach. See notes 28-31 infra and accompanying text.
18. 2 CCH COMm. MKT. Rm. 8161, at 8027 (1972), 11 Comm. Mlkt. L.R. at 622.
19. Id., 11 Comm. Mlkt. L.R. at 622-23.
20. See Note, Common Market-Antitrust-Interpretation of Concerted Practices
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The Court in Dyestuffs based its finding of concerted practices on
the argument that through advance announcement by dyestuff manu-
facturers of proposed price increases,
the various enterprises eliminated any uncertainty as to their future conduct
and therefore also much of the normal risk connected with any autonomous
change in conduct on one or more markets .... [Thus] the enterprises ...
temporarily eliminated some of the conditions of competition in the market
which prevented uniform parallel conduct.2 1
Note that the Court fixed liability on the ground that those conditions
which prevented uniform parallel conduct were eliminated, not upon any
affirmative understanding between the parties to engage in such con-
duct.22 Because the 1964 price increase demonstrated the possibility of
"price leadership," the Dyestuffs Court calmly presumed that any advance
announcement of a price hike which had the effect of reducing the risks
of competition was an invitation to collusion. In other words, because
collusion was possible and uniformity was present, the parties were held
to have engaged in a concerted practice.
I1
THE TREATY OF ROME AND CULPABILITY
It should be apparent that the Dyestuffs decision did little to distin-
guish the meaning of "concerted practices" from "conscious parallelism."
By minimizing the significance of culpability, the Court demonstrated its
willingness to hold enterprises strictly liable for ostensibly noncompetitive
markets. 23 That this is neither consonant with the purposes of article
85(1) nor in accord with the needs of the Common Market can be shown
by a detailed examination of the Treaty of Rome itself.
within Meaning of Article 85, 14 HARv. INT'L L.J. 621, 625 (1973); 13 VA. J. INT'L L.
375, 879 (1973).
21. 2 CCH Coma. MKT. REP. 8161, at 8029 (1972), 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 626.
22. The Court, however, did devote some attention to facts from which intention
(or lack thereof) could have been inferred. It concluded that the European dyestuffs
market could not be considered a strict oligopoly, since in such a market price competi-
tion could no longer play an important part, and in the dyestuffs market the producers
were powerful and numerous enough to create a substantial risk that some of them
would not subscribe to price leadership. Id., 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 626. But the
Court's analysis of the markets was superficial at best. See Korah, Concerted Practices,
36 MoDERN L RLv. 220, 224 (1973). Moreover, as the refusal of ACNA to join the price
hike indicated, there were five relevant markets, not one, and these were oligopolistic.
Id. at 22. Finally, nowhere does it clearly appear that the Court actually did infer
any anticompetitive intent from the economic analysis in which it dabbled. For a
fuller discussion of how such intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, see
notes 48-49 infra and accompanying text.
23. See Korah, supra note 22, at 225-26.
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Under accepted rules of treaty interpretation,2 4 it is unclear whether
the signatories intended, through the use of the words "concerted prac-
tice," to make illegal all uniform pricing or only uniform pricing
practices which are accompanied by anticompetitive intent.25 Commenta-
tors have had difficulty clarifying the problem.2 6 Confronted with such
24. The Treaty of Rome must be interpreted pursuant to the rules applying to
international treaties because, although governing a supranational organization it came
into being as an international treaty between states. Coing, International Problems of
Article 85, 88 N.Y.U.L. REv. 441, 447 (1963). According to international rules, the prob-
lem of interpretation is to determine the common intentions of the parties by first
examining the "natural and ordinary meaning" of the words used, at least in the
absence of authoritative records of intention as here. R16solutions adoptdes par l'institut
t la Session de Grenade 11-20 avril 1956, art. 1, para. 1, in [1956] ANN. DE ' INsTrruT DE
DRorr INTERNATIONAL 358, 559, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 644, 645 (1956).
25. The problem of determining the natural and ordinary meaning of the term
"concerted practices" is complicated by the fact that the term as it appears in different
official translations has different connotations. For example, the Italian version of
Article 85(1) seems to encompass the concept of "conscious parallelism." 2 BusINESS
REGULATION IN TI-E COaMMON MART NATIONs 519 (H.M. Blake ed. 1969). But the
German version is translated as "mutually attuned modes of conduct" which, while
not necessarily connoting agreed-upon action, does seem to require some consensual
element that distinguishes it from mere "conscious parallelism." C. OBERDORFER, A.
GLEiss & M. Hutsca, supra note 9, at 14.
Ordinarily, where there are differing official versions, the original wording of the
treaty, or the wording which served as the basis for negotiations is examined, using
a theory of historical interpretation to determine the intent of the parties. OP'HiLs,
FEsTGABE rR MuLLER-ARmAK 283-84, cited in Coing, supra note 24, at 449. The
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, [1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 19 (preference
given to the English wording of the Palestine mandate because it was the original
wording). Speaking specifically about article 85, it is unknown which wording was
first in time. Coing, supra note 24, at 451. Under these circumstances the next procedure
is to compare the different versions of the term for semantic content, in other words
their main substance, regarding that content which is common to all as what was
mutually agreed upon. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, supra, and the explana-
tion in Coing, supra note 24, at 449. The difficulty in applying this rule is determining
whether the semantic content of "concerted practice," which includes not only some
form of agreement but conscious parallelism, is less broad than that which does not
include conscious parallelism.
26. Consider, for example, the conclusions of Oberdorfer, Gleiss and Hirsch. For
them, a concerted practice requires the establishment of and adherence to a plan im-
posing less of an obligation on the participating parties than a gentleman's duty, but
more than mere conscious parallelism. They maintain that the participants
need not establish direct contact with one another, but only that the plan actually be
communicated by someone, if only a third party. C. OBERDORFER, A. GLiss & H.
HmscH, supra note 9, at 15. Having thus made the argument that a concerted practice
requires at least some form of agreement, they proceed to proclaim that the manner
of concerting is immaterial and that article 85 is directed at the result, not the means.
Id. at 16.
Similar confusion is exhibited by Deringer who also sees concert in a common plan
which must be established by a mutual understanding of the parties concerning their
future economic behavior. A. DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAw OF THE EUROPEAN
EcONOMfIC COMMUNITY: 121, at 12 (1968). Deringer specifically classifies mutual under-
standing as a form of agreement, and even distinguishes concious parallelism by de-
claring that there is no concerted practice where "an enterprise, by unilateral action,
consciously and intentionally conforms its own behavior to that of another enterprise,
as, for example, in the case of price leadership." Id. at 13. Having done all this,
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uncertainty, EEC tribunals, in construing the term "concerted practice,"
should strive for that meaning which is most compatible with the overall
approach to antitrust regulation embodied in the Treaty of Rome. 27
Basically, there are two ways to regulate competition among enter-
prises. One may be termed a rule-oriented approach, 28 the other a result-
oriented approach.29 An interpretation of "concerted practice" requiring
the Commission to prove that uniform pricing activities are the result
of anticompetitive intent is most compatible with a rule-oriented ap-
proach.8 0 An interpretation which permits the Commission to impose a
form of strict liability for uniform pricing practices best comports with a
result-oriented approach.81 Which of these two approaches is embodied by
the Treaty of Rome is the subject of the following analysis.
The Common Market's approach to antitrust regulation has its roots
in the basic objectives of the Community 2 as articulated in article 288
he nevertheless makes the statement that concerted practices extend to prohibit cases
of "cooperation purely as a matter of fact." Id. 119, at 11.
27. Coing, supra note 24, at 449-50, 452, notes that when standard rules of treaty
interpretation are unsuccessful, the particular term should be evaluated in regard to
the context in which it is set in the treaty. There are two levels at which the context
should be examined. The first is the narrower context of the specific section, sentence,
or phrase of the treaty in which the term is found. See Geitling v. Haute Autorite
8 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour 165, 218 (Cour de Justice de la Communaut6
europenne 1962), where the European Court of Justice, interpreting the European
Coal and Steel Treaty, resorted to examination of the specific context in which the
term was set. In this connection, at least one writer has argued that article 85(1) places
concerted practices on the same level as agreements between enterprises and decisions
of associations "so that established rules of treaty interpretation render it impossible
to attribute a meaning to the term 'concerted practices' which is not ejusdem generis
and would render some form of consensus redundant." Mann, The Dyestuffs Case in
the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 22 INr'L & CoMp. L.Q. 85, 86 (1978).
The second sense in which context can be examined refers to the consistency of a
specific term with the "system embodied in and the aims pursued by the treaty."
Coing, supra note 24, at 448, 452-53.
28. This seeks to control the behavior of enterprises through emphasis on adherence
to a system of rules which define what types of behavior are noncompetitive and there-
by embody the goals and purposes of regulation.
29. This seeks to implement the goals and purposes of regulation directly by doing
whatever is necessary to achieve a particular desired result.
80. Since the rule-oriented approach emphasizes adherence to certain principles, it
recognizes that competition is not only a type of objective behavior, but also a state
of mind. Hence, this approach focuses on culpability.
31. Since the result-oriented approach is concerned primarily with consequences, it
sees competition only as a type of objective behavior. Whether or not particular enter-
prises intended to act competitively or anticompetitively is irrelevant.
82. See Ellis, Source Material for Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty, 82 FoRaH. L. REv.
247, 248-49 (1968).
3. Article 2 reads:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to
promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an
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and article 3(f) 34 of the Treaty of Rome. Recognizing this, Ellis has sum-
marized the purpose, aims, and objectives of article 85, based upon an
analysis of the reports and documents comprising the actes prdparatoires
of the Treaty of Rome, including the Spaak Report,3 5 and relevant case
law:
In the conception of the authors of the Treaty, the fusion of the separate
markets-or, in other words, the establishment of a common market-is one of
the two essential conditions for realizing the objects of the Community, while
undistorted competition is a fundamental condition for the success of such
a common market. The rules which have to ensure that the free play of
competition within the common market is not distorted fulfill a derivative,
protective function, consisting in preventing the Community's objectives from
being frustrated by disturbances in the functioning of the common market
caused by distortions of competition.36
In fulfilling its protective function, article 85(l) must somehow strike a
balance between control over behavior having noncompetitive effects and
freedom of commercial enterprise for the type of maximum economic
development described in article 2. Since the term "concerted practice" is
an essential component of article 85, its meaning must enhance that
balance. This should be remembered in considering the following series
of arguments.
A. ARGUMENTS FOR THE RESULT-ORIENTED APPROACH
It is a fact that not every cartel or agreement not to compete is dam-
aging to economic and industrial development. Schwartz and Wellman
have observed that "both individual behavior and arrangements among
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the
States belonging to it.
1 CCH CoMIa. MET. REP. 165 (1973), 298 U.N.T.S. at 15.
34. Article 3(f) reads:
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall
include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set
out therein... (f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the
common market is not distorted ....
1 CCH Commfr. Mar. REP. 171 (1973), 298 U.N.T.S. at 15-16.
35. Comit6 Intergouvernemental Cr66 Par La Conference De Messine, Rapport Des
Chefs De D616gation Aim Ministres Des Affaires Etrangres, Doc. MAE 120 f/56 (1956),
cited in Ellis, supra note 32, at 248. Paul-Henri Spaak was the Chairman of the Inter-
governmental Committee which was established during the Messina Conference on
June 1-2, 1955. The report was accepted by the Conference of Ministers at Venice as
a basis for the subsequent negotiations which took place at Val Duchesse near Brussels.
Ellis, supra note 32, at 248.
36. Ellis, supra note 32, at 276. Accord, Linssen, The Application of Articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty, in STAFF Or SENATE SUBCOAA. ON ANTrRUsT AND MONOPOLY OF THE
SENATE COAMn. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
EUROPEAN COivniON MARKET 160 (Comm. Print 1964) (hereinafter cited as EEC ANTI-
Tmusr DEVELOPMENTs). Clearly, the other essential condition is the approximation of the
economic policies of the member states.
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independent firms, which may contribute to the creation of market power,
may at the same time enhance the efficiency with which the processes of
production and distribution of goods are conducted."87 In light of the
overriding importance to the Common Market of maximum economic de-
velopment, as described in article 2, it can be argued that the framers of
the Treaty of Rome intended to permit selective application of the anti-
trust machinery, so that those anticompetitive practices which produce the
desired result of overall Community well-being and a higher standard of
living for the inhabitants of its members would not be impaired. If this
is true and the framers thus intended a result-oriented approach to pre-
vent beneficial cartels from being destroyed, it is a short step to argue
that they intended the same approach to provide more effective control
of uniform pricing practices which, regardless of the culpability of the
parties involved, are harmful to the Community. Such an argument finds
some support in Ellis' analysis of the Spaak Report:
It is to be noted that, while the rules of competition contained in the Treaty
are exactly those advocated by the Spaak report with a view to attaining normal
conditions of fair competition the expressions "normal" and "fair" competition
are not to be found either in the ultimate actes prdparatoires or in the articles
of the Treaty. The Treaty has summarized these conditions and stated them
more precisely by prescribing that competition must not be distorted.... This
requirement ... is one which relates directly to the requirements of a proper
functioning of the fused markets, and this expression therefore ties the ele-
ments of fair and normal competition to the objectives of the common
market.88
The terms "normal" and "fair" admit to wide interpretation. They are
subjective terms through which broad formulations of economic policy
can enter antitrust regulation. That the framers considered the word
"distortion" to embody these two terms may indicate that they intended
the Commission to have significant discretion in defining what amounts
to anticompetitive behavior. If that is the case, a construction of "con-
certed practice" which ignores the culpability of the parties involved and
focuses merely on the effects of their behavior, for whatever purpose, is
most appropriate.
Another reason for believing that the framers intended a result-oriented
37. Schwartz & Wellman, The Rule of Reason in EEC Antitrust: Efficiency Enhance-
ment Through Integration by Agreement Among Competitors, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 192,
193 (1972). The argument also draws support from Angulo and Minshall who have
noted, "[t]hroughout European Development, the policy behind trade regulation ap-
pears to have been the elimination and control of abusive practices, not of monop-
olies or restrictive practices themselves." Angulo & Minshall, An Inquiry into The
Economic Philosophies Underlying Antitrust Regulation in the United States and the
European Economic Community, 4 VA. J. Ir'rT L. 139, 163 (1964).
38. Ellis, supra note 32, at 252-53.
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approach is based on the difficulty of proving culpability from circum-
stantial evidence. In a concentrated market situation (where the effects
of conscious parallelism are most like those of an agreement not to com-
pete), a few large enterprises having vast resources at their disposal are not
only in a favorable position for easy collusion, but are also well equipped
through financial leverage and other means to disguise such collusion.39
In this way, they can avoid effective and necessary regulation under any
construction of concerted practice which requires the Commission to
prove culpable anticompetitive behavior. In addition, since anticomped-
tive activity under article 85 is not forbidden by the criminal law as
malum in se, but is merely a form of undesirable economic activity, at
least one writer has suggested that this fact alone justifies a less burden-
some standard of prooL 40 In light of these two considerations, one could
say that "concerted practice" should be interpreted, on purely practical
grounds, to mean strict liability for uniform pricing practices.
B. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE RULE-ORIENTED APPROACH
That the Treaty of Rome embodies a rule-oriented approach to anti-
trust regulation is apparent from the structure of article 85. The primary
emphasis of that provision is on rule adherence, as is demonstrated by
the flat prohibition in article 85(1) of "agreements," "decisions" or "con-
certed practices" which distort competition.41 In order to provide flexi-
bility in the enforcement of article 85(1) however, the framers of the
Treaty of Rome provided in article 85(3) that if the benefits of conduct
found illegal under article 85(1) outweigh the harm, such conduct will
nevertheless be permitted, regardless of its formal illegality.4 In this
39. Attending such problems are those normally associated with any attempt to
prove the mental state of individuals, primarily the necessity of relying on circum-
stantial evidence.
40. See Steindorff, Annotation on the Dyestuff Cases, 9 COTMM. MT. L. REv. 502(1972).
41. For a copy of the relevant text, see note 1 supra. For authority supporting the
position see Ellis, supra note 32, at 277.
42. Article 85(3) reads:
The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; which contributes
to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit, and which does not:(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not in-
dispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
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manner, the framers provided the Commission with enough discretion
to apply the antitrust machinery selectively, so that there would be no
conflict between control of anticompetitive behavior and the goal of
maximum economic development. Because the Treaty of Rome has thus
separated its rule-oriented provision from its result-oriented provision, it
is difficult to maintain that the meaning of "concerted practice" in article
85(1) should be construed to implement in any way the purposes of article
85(3). This is particularly important since article 85(3) flexibility is of the
"one way" type, permitting the Commission to exercise discretion only in
regard to concerted practices already established under article 85(1).
It does not grant the Commission power to relax the requirements of
article 85(1) and find a concerted practice where nonculpable uniform
pricing behavior is especially damaging to the Community's economic
development. Clearly article 85's structure stands in direct contradiction
to any thought that the meaning of the word "distortion" in article 85(1)
justifies the Commission in exercising anything more than ex post facto
discretion.
In addition to mentioning the structural arguments supporting a rule-
oriented approach, it should also be pointed out that such an approach
is free of the numerous practical and administrative difficulties endemic
to one which is result-oriented. Saving arguments about burden of proof
for section III of this Note, one could begin a list of such difficulties by
noting some of the enforcement problems implicit in a result-oriented
approach. Unless the Commission chooses to adopt the solution of di-
vestiture,43 it could find extreme difficulty in altering the behavior of
enterprises which may never have entered any form of agreement or even
arrived at some mutual understanding. Though the Commission would
have the authority to manipulate consequences, businessmen must act
according to principles. If it were merely a particular end which was to
be avoided-uniform prices for example-enterprises would be placed in
the position of attempting to act non-uniformly and such a system might
ultimately require deliberate price differentiation. The chaos would be
enormous, not to mention the severe damage to any notion of free enter-
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
1 CCH Cozam. MKT. REP. 2051 (1973), 298 U.N.T.S. at 48.
43. This is suggested by Korah, supra note 22, at 226, who also points out that at
present the Commission may not have power to order divestiture and that, in any case,
the cost would be very great. Id. at 226 n.10.
[Vol. 7: 113
Conscious Parallelism in the EEC
prise.44 Moreover, some form of agreement can usually be neutralized by
an injunctive order; that is dearly not true for conscious parallelism. 45
Other problems in addition to enforcement are also readily apparent.
First, the Commission's actions under such an approach would probably
be relatively unpredictable owing to the necessity for evaluating each case
individually.46 This in itself can be counterproductive, especially with
respect to economic growth and development which often require a stable
legal environment. More significantly, such uncertainty could eliminate
any incentives for enterprises to undertake "questionable" activities that
would have beneficial effects for the Community. Excessive caution would
prevail. Second, such a system would encourage a see-no-evil policy
whereby enterprises would avoid including in their market calculations
the reactions of their competitors in order to minimize any possibility
of parallelism. That in itself would weaken the ability of enterprises to
compete. Finally, the wide discretion permitted the Commission would
open the way to abuse by which the views of the Commission would be
substituted for the operation of free market forces.
III
THE PROBLEM OF PROOF
It appears that the Common Market's approach to antitrust regulation
is rule-oriented. The construction of "concerted practice" which is most
compatible with that approach is one which requires the Commission to
prove an element of anticompetitive intent in addition to the existence
of uniform prices. The question remains whether such a construction
requires the Commission to shoulder an impractical burden of proof.
An examination of American jurisprudence and learned commentary47
44. The problem is neatly summarized as follows:
Once one seller lowers his price, another must lower his in order to maintain
his own share of the market, unless his product is sufficiently differentiated to
give him a monopoly in the market. But if he lowers his price to merely
match the first price cutter, he will be accused of parallel action. Must he
strike even lower?
Note, supra note 9, at 684.
45. Id.
46. See Korah, supra note 22, at 225-26, who points out such difficulties already exist
in the wake of Dyestuffs.
47. Section 1 of the Sherman Act has many similarities to article 85: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal
. ... 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1971).
It is the opinion of at least three European commentators that the concept of con-
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reveals that workable evidentiary standards for distinguishing between
uniform pricing coupled with anticompetitive intent (concerted practice)
and purely competitive uniform pricing (conscious parallelism) do exist.
Basically, anticompetitive intent can be inferred from three types of
circumstantial evidence. The first of these is evidence that the market
structure in which the particular enterprises under investigation operate
is not sufficiently transparent or oligopolistic to support conscious parallel-
ism. Such evidence would be based on information regarding the number
and size of the enterprises involved, the sizes of their particular market
shares, the comparability of their production and cost structures, as well
as any other factors pertaining to the structure of a market and its per-
formance characteristics. 48 For independent behavior to produce effects
similar to those resulting from an agreement not to compete, each
enterprise must be able to gather sufficient data from existing market
conditions and past behavior of competitors to predict with reasonable
certed practices in article 85(1) is related to the concept of concerted acts known to
the Anglo-American legal system and pertaining to the notion of conspiracy. See
C. QOajmoRFER, A GLEISS & M. Hmscf, supra note 9, at 14. In addition, the develop-
ment of the concept of concerted acts reflects a sensitivity to the problem of conscious
parallelism. In a series of cases, American courts toyed with the notion that concerted
action could be established by mere proof of conscious parallelism. Dicta in American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 828 U.S. 781, 810 (1946), indicated that conspiracy could
be proven by circumstantial evidence of an "understanding" between parties. Within
four years, some lower courts had stretched the idea far enough to be able to declare,
as did the court in Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D. Pa. 1950):
In practical effect, consciously parallel business practices have taken place of
the concept of meeting of the minds which some of the earlier cases empha-
sized. Present concert of action, further proof of actual agreement among defen-
dants is unnecessary ....
But the Supreme Court was not prepared to discard the requirements that concerted
acts must still include some form of culpable anti-competitive behavior. In Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 587 (1954), it pruned
the blossoming career of the conscious parallelism doctrine by a now famous dictum:
[This Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior con-
clusively establishes agreement . . . . Circumstantial evidence of consciously
parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial
attitude toward conspiracy; but "conscious parallelism" has not yet read con-
spiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.
Id. at 541. Because the development of the concept of concerted acts reveals a concern
that antitrust violations be based on culpable behavior, a survey of the American
experience can be a very useful guide to the formulation of workable standards for
proving anti-competitive intent.
48. It has been argued that such market analysis makes the scope of inquiry too large
and unmanageable. Posner, supra note 6, at 1588. Such a criticism is of only limited
significance here for two reasons: first, since artificiality is based upon a comparison of
what the market's structure will justify with what is actually present in the form
of noncompetitive effects, the extent of the market analysis required is restricted to
those factors which could possibly produce a certain limited effect and no more; second,
even if the scope of inquiry were enlarged, such enlargement would only be necessary
to distinguish culpable behavior from competitive behavior.
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accuracy future behavior and future market conditions. The greater the
ability of an enterprise to anticipate its competitors, the more likely it
will be that uniform or complementary pricing behavior will result. It
should be remembered that the existence of a perfect oligopoly situation
is not always necessary for an enterprise to be able to anticipate its
competitors. A finding of anticompetitive intent should not be made
unless it can be shown that no facts existed which, when combined with
reasonable techniques of economic analysis, could have enabled enter-
prises acting independently to produce uniform prices. Of course, any
evidence of intervening factors which would prevent even an oligopolistic
market from becoming transparent should also be considered.
A second type of circumstantial evidence which may be used is that
showing behavior incon istent with purely competitive intent.49 Examples
of this type of evidence have been suggested by Posner:50 (1) evidence
that firms practice systematic price discrimination, i.e., a pattern of selling
in which the "ratio of price to marginal cost is not the same for all sales
of a commodity"; 51 (2) prolonged excess of capacity over demand; (3) evi-
dence regarding changes in market price-"prices of noncompeting
sellers should change less frequently than prices of competing firms due
to difficulty in agreeing at mutually acceptable standards"; 52 (4) ab-
normal profits (even for an oligopoly); and (5) extremely uniform and
long continued price leadership.5 3
The third way to prove anticompetitive intent is by circumstantial evi-
dence of a mutually adopted plan the logical consequence of which is price
uniformity. Implicit in any plan is the existence of some form of agree-
ment or mutual understanding between the parties involved to cooperate.
Such an understanding can be established where reasonable men in the
49. Id. at 1578. See also the recent case of Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co. 448 F.2d 17
(9th Cir. 1971), in which the Court of Appeals held that in an antitrust action by a
motion picture exhibitor against distributors and other exhibitors, a Sherman Act
conspiracy was not established where the plaintiff was able to bid competitively for
the first-run showings of films and acquire some films, and where there was an explana-
tion wholly consistent with proper business operations as to every instance in which
plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to obtain film from distributors.
50. Posner, supra note 6, at 1578-82.
51. Id. at 1578.
52. Id. at 1580.
53. Other more traditional types of evidence include (1) fixed market shares for a
substantial period, (2) filed identical sealed bids on non-standard items, (3) refusal to
give discounts in the face of substantial excess capacity, (4) announcement of price
increases far in advance without legitimate business justification for doing so, and (5)
public statements of what a seller considers the right price for the industry to maintain.
Id. at 1582.
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positions of the parties would believe that they had at least morally obli-
gated themselves by some action or statement to assist each other rather
than compete.54 One example of a court's reliance on evidence of a
mutually adopted plan is Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States55 in
which the Supreme Court focused on a letter which it construed as an
invitation to participate in an unlawful scheme. 56 In that case, eight
motion picture film distributors were found to have agreed with each
other, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, to enter into and
carry out certain contracts with two exhibitors of first run films. The
contracts obligated each distributor who signed to require second run
exhibitors to maintain a certain minimiun price of admission. The Court
found that the unlawful agreement between distributors consisted in
their mutual adherence to a plan, the necessary consequence of which
was an unlawful restraint of interstate commerce. In finding the existence
of a plan, the Court emphasized the fact that each distributor had
received a letter from one of the first run exhibitors naming all of the
other distributors as addressees and proposing the contract terms which
were eventually adopted in substance by each.57 The Court also em-
phasized that each distributor "knew that all were in active competition
and that without substantially unanimous action there was a risk of sub-
stantial loss of business and goodwill, but that with unanimity there was
the prospect of increased profits" and that this was a strong motive for
"concerted action."58
54. Consider the following statement by A. D. Neale:
Whenever there is a plan, there is mutual awareness among the participants;
but it does not follow that whenever there is mutual awareness, there is a plan.
A plan implies some assurance of reliable action in the future; its breakdown
will usually be a matter for reproach between the parties. "Conscious parallel-
ism of action" is without this quasi-moral element. The actions of others may
be highly predictable, as when a number of firms refuse to deal with a bad
credit risk, or the film distributors refuse first runs to a "flea pit"; but an un-
foreseen action is regarded as a fact, like a change in the weather, and not as
a betrayal, like a change of allegiance.
1 A. D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAwS OF THE UNrTED STATES OF AMERICA 88 (2d ed.
197o).
55. 86 U.S. 208 (1939).
56. Id. at 216. Without that letter, it is doubtful that concerted action could have
been established. Note, supra note 9, at 683.
57. Cf. Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 473 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1973),
where the details of the plan were published by the defendant in a book and were
later agreed to individually in meetings and consultations. This case also provides a
summary of the current law on the requirement of intent.
58. The Court also observed behavior inconsistent with competitive intent noting
that compliance with the proposals involved radical departures from previous business
practices; that there was opposition to them by three of the distributors' local man-
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In United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.59 the Supreme Court found a
mutually adopted plan in which a drug manufacturer, embarking on a
program to promote general compliance with the suggested retail prices
it had published, induced wholesalers to refuse to deal with any retailer
who disregarded the suggested prices. Here the Court emphasized the
verbal discussions between each wholesaler and representatives of Parke
Davis in which the wholesalers were informed that Parke Davis would
refuse to deal with those who sold to retailers who did not observe the
suggested price minimums. Also emphasized was that in these discussions
each wholesaler was told that its competitors were receiving the same
information.60
In still another case, United States v. Container Corp. of America,61 the
Supreme Court found that a mutually adopted plan was established
through the reciprocal exchange of price information. The facts indicated
that each producer, upon request by a competitor, would furnish informa-
tion as to the most recent price charged or quoted to individual customers
with the expectation of reciprocity and the understanding that it repre-
sented the price currently being bid. The exchange stabilized prices, al-
though at a downward level. In finding concerted action, the Court said,
"[t]here was of course freedom to withdraw from the agreement. But the
fact remains that when a defendant requested and received price informa-
tion, it was affirming its willingness to furnish such information in
return."62
While it should now be apparent that it is possible to formulate work-
agers, and that without agreement there was a dear risk of diversity of action. 306 US.
at 227.
59. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
60. A similar plan was found in United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127
(1966). There, General Motors and certain auto dealers and their associations imple-
mented a mutually adopted plan to deprive franchised dealers of freedom to deal
through discounters. As in Parke Davis, General Motors elicited agreements from all
the dealers that none of them would do business with the discounters. These agree-
ments, which were interrelated and interdependent were worked out in meetings and
telephone conversations in which it was acknowledged that substantial unanimity was
essential for their success.
61. 93 U.S. 333 (1969).
62. Id. at 335. Compare the basis for the Court's finding of concerted acts in this case
with the manner in which the Court of Justice established concerted practices in the
Dyestuffs case. In Container Corp., the evidence showed that detailed price information
on individual customers was furnished with the expectation of reciprocity. In Dye-
stuffs, on the other hand, the evidence mentioned by the Court of Justice did not
show any actual expectation of reciprocity when prices were announced. There was
nothing to indicate that the intentions of the parties involved were to obligate them-
selves to follow any certain scheme of cooperation.
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able standards for proving anticompetitive intent from circumstantial
evidence, one caveat is in order. It is important to remember that these
standards, while valid, are only reference points to guide the trier of facts
in evaluating a given body of circumstantial evidence. They are foci
around which to associate different bits of information. As such they are
necessarily somewhat crude indicia of whether a concerted practice is
actually present since in the evaluation of circumstantial evidence, a
concerted practice can be found if it is only reasonable to conclude that
enterprises have acted with the requisite intent. Within the broad range
of what is reasonable, conscious parallelism and concerted practices can
co-exist. Consequently, it must be recognized that even where there are
well designed criteria for distinguishing concerted practices from con-
scious parallelism, such criteria can rarely, if ever, be perfectly effective.
CONCLUSION
Behind current efforts to determine the appropriate meaning of the
term "concerted practice" in article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome is a
fundamental conflict over basic antitrust policy. It arises from the neces-
sity of Community antitrust laws to somehow strike a balance between
control over behavior having noncompetitive effects and the freedom
of commercial enterprise necessary to insure the kind of continuous and
stable economic development described in article 2 of the Treaty of
Rome. The issue of whether this can best be accomplished by a rule-
oriented approach or a result-oriented approach is raised by the failure
of the Court of Justice in the Dyestuffs case to adequately distinguish
concerted practices from conscious parallelism. There, the Court in effect
held the enterprises involved strictly liable for the decline of price
competition in dyestuffs in EEC markets. It has been shown that this is
inconsistent with the purposes of the Treaty of Rome and the needs of
the Common Market, and that more attention to the proof of anti-
competitive intent is necessary. That workable evidentiary standards are
available for this task is beyond question, although they are not infalli-
ble. The underlying premise of article 85 is that some imperfection is
but a small price to pay for an antitrust policy based on the individual
responsibility of enterprises acting in truly free competition.
Michael Ray Pfeifer
